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 In the United States, approximately 7.5 million people are stalked each year.1 
Stalking is generally defined as a course of conduct directed at an individual that 
would make a reasonable person fearful.2 Stalking is a crime under federal law, as 
well as in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territories.3 In 1999, 
New York recognized stalking as a crime after research revealed that thirty per cent 
of all women who were murdered were killed by a former intimate partner who had 
stalked them.4 New York proscribes four degrees of stalking, varying in severity from 
stalking in the fourth degree, a class B misdemeanor, to stalking in the first degree, 
a class D felony.5 Stalking in the fourth degree outlines the basic conduct of stalking: 
a defendant “intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person . . . [that] is likely to cause reasonable fear of 
material harm.”6
 Stalking is a common form of workplace abuse.7 Roughly one out of every eight 
employed stalking victims reports missing as many as five work days or more because 
of stalking.8 With changes in technology, the manifestations of stalking behavior have 
broadened to “cyberstalking,” defined as “[t]he act of threatening, harassing, or 
annoying someone through multiple e-mail messages, as through the Internet, 
esp[ecially] with the intent of placing the recipient in fear that an illegal act or an injury 
will be inflicted on the recipient or a member of the recipient’s family or household.”9
 Yet, in People v. Marian, the New York County Criminal Court ruled that e-mails 
sent to the victim’s work e-mail address did not meet the legal requirements of 
section 120.45(3) of the New York Penal Law (NYPL), which penalizes stalking 
someone at her workplace.10 The court found that a work e-mail address is not a 




4. Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999, ch. 635, § 2, 1999 N.Y. Laws 3365, 3365 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2017)). Another study showed that, out of a sample 
of 141 femicide victims, seventy-six per cent were stalked by an intimate partner within twelve months 
of the femicide. Judith M. McFarlane et al., Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide, 3 Homicide Stud. 
300, 308 (1999).
5. Penal §§ 120.45–.60.
6. Id. § 120.45(1). Factors that increase the severity of the charge include: the age of the victim; whether the 
stalker used a weapon; and whether the stalker has prior convictions for stalking, harassment, or 
kidnapping. Id. §§ 120.45–.60.
7. DOL Workplace Violence Program, U.S. Dep’t Lab., https://www.dol.gov/oasam/hrc/policies/dol-
workplace-violence-program.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
8. Stalking Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
9. Cyberstalking, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
10. 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 687 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
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“place of employment or business” within section 120.45(3), despite the prevalence of 
both workplace stalking and cyberstalking.11
 This case comment contends that the Marian court erred in its statutory 
interpretation by not only looking outside the statute, but by utilizing the New York 
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) to define a term from a criminal statute. The 
court’s unduly technical reading of the information charge12 arbitrarily excluded 
certain dangerous and prevalent behaviors from the reach of section 120.45(3). 
Furthermore, the court’s reliance on the CPLR and civil practice to support its 
holding was inconsistent with current case law and should not have been applied to a 
criminal case.
 In People v. Marian, the victim and the defendant were involved in a romantic 
relationship and then broke up, which led to the events at issue in the case.13 In the 
ninety-one day period from January 17 to April 17, 2015, the victim received over 
one hundred Instagram and text messages from her ex-girlfriend, the defendant, and 
approximately ten to fifteen e-mails, which were sent to her personal and work 
e-mail addresses.14 During a three-day period, the victim received approximately 
eighty phone calls from the defendant.15 On January 23, the defendant “accused the 
[victim]  .  .  . of assaulting her.”16 However, the defendant later admitted that this 
allegation was baseless, and that she intentionally fabricated it to prevent the victim 
from obtaining a restraining order against her.17 On February 25, the defendant went 
to The Bowery Electric bar in Manhattan roughly an hour after the victim did.18 
The victim had not informed the defendant that she would be at that location.19 
Inside the bar, the defendant grabbed the victim by the neck and the victim asked 
11. Id. at 685.
12. An information is an accusatory instrument that serves the same purpose in a misdemeanor prosecution 
that an indictment serves in a felony prosecution: it “must set forth ‘nonhearsay allegations which, if 
true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.’” People v. 
Dixon, No. 2014NY005400, 997 N.Y.S.2d 100, 2014 WL 3746803, at *5 (Crim. Ct. July 30, 2014) 
(unpublished table decision) (quoting People v. Kalin, 906 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 2009)). It is not 
required to allege facts that would prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “[r]ather, the 
Information need only contain allegations of fact that ‘give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a 
defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.’” 
Id. (quoting People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (N.Y. 2000)).
13. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685–86.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 686.
16. Id. at 685.
17. Id.




that she leave.20 Instead, the defendant waited outside the bar for two hours and then 
followed the victim for two blocks after she left the bar.21
 A month later, the victim was at another Manhattan bar, Hotel Chantelle, and 
the defendant once again appeared without the victim informing the defendant of 
her destination.22 Again, the defendant waited for the victim to leave the bar and 
followed her for two blocks, stating, “I won’t leave you alone. I’ll never stop.”23 The 
victim testified that on March 30, the defendant went to her home after one o’clock 
in the morning and waited outside.24 Later that day, the District Attorney’s Office 
dismissed the false assault charges that the defendant had made against the victim.25 
On April 8, for a third time, the defendant appeared at a bar where the victim was; 
once again, the victim had not told her where she would be.26
 The defendant was arraigned on April 9, 2015, and charged with a misdemeanor 
in violation of sections 120.45(2)27 (“Personal Anti-Stalking Statute”) and 120.45(3)28 
(“Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute”) of the NYPL.29 The charge under the 
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute was based on the ten to fifteen e-mails that the 
defendant sent to the victim’s personal and work e-mail addresses.30 On May 18, 
2015, the defendant filed a motion challenging all counts against her, including both 
counts of the stalking charge.31 The defendant argued that the facts were insufficient 






25. Id. at 685.
26. Id. at 686.
27. N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45(2) (McKinney 2017). Section 120.45(2) provides as follows:
A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for 
no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and 
knows or reasonably should know that such conduct:  .  .  . causes material harm to the 
mental or emotional health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, 
telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such 
person’s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and 
the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct[.]
 Id.
28. Section 120.45(2) differs from section 120.45(3) in that conduct captured within the latter section must 
cause the victim “to reasonably fear that his or her employment, business or career is threatened, where 
such conduct consists of appearing, telephoning or initiating communication or contact at such person’s 
place of employment or business, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.” 
Id. § 120.45(3).
29. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685.
30. Id. at 687.
31. Id. at 685.
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Anti-Stalking Statute because the victim’s work e-mail address was not her “place of 
employment or business” as required under the statute.32
 To establish a prima facie case33 of stalking in the fourth degree under the 
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, the facts of the case must support a showing that 
(1) the offender engaged in a course of conduct for no legitimate purpose; (2) the 
course of conduct was intentional; (3) the conduct was directed at a specific person; 
(4) the acts were committed with actual or constructive knowledge that such conduct 
was likely to cause that victim to reasonably fear that her employment, business, or 
career was threatened; and (5) the offender must have been told to cease the conduct 
of appearing, telephoning, or initiating communication or contact at the victim’s 
place of employment or business.34
 The primary issue in Marian, and a question of first impression in New York, was 
whether the requirement in the fifth factor, that communications be sent to the 
victim’s “place of employment or business,” is satisfied by numerous e-mails sent to the 
victim’s work e-mail address.35 The court began by stating that its duty is to construe 
NYPL provisions “according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and 
effect the objects of the law.”36 The court determined that the fair import of “place of 
employment or business” was that the term refers to an “actual, physical location,” 
noting that the CPLR requires a physical location for serving a summons and 
complaint to a “place of business.”37 The court reasoned that, although courts in New 
York have allowed service via e-mail on occasion, such is considered an “alternate 
method of service” under rule 308(5) of the CPLR, which “indicates that an email 
address is treated as something distinct from an actual, physical location.”38 The 
Marian court acknowledged that the CPLR is not binding on a criminal court, but 
defended its use thereof by stating that, without instruction from the legislature, or a 
clear legislative intent to include e-mails in the statute, it was practical to interpret the 
phrase “place of employment or business” consistently across all practice areas.39
 The court determined that the phrase “communication or contact” under the 
Personal Anti-Stalking Statute includes the act of sending an e-mail, but such 
32. Id. at 686.
33. Id. at 686–87. 
The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that an information allege facts 
that would prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the information 
need only contain allegations of fact that “give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a 
defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for 
the same offense.”
 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (N.Y. 2000)).
34. See People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 41 (N.Y. 2003).
35. See Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685.






conduct is “completely subsumed” within the Personal, rather than the Workplace 
Anti-Stalking Statute.40 It found that the defendant’s act of sending e-mails to the 
victim’s work e-mail address also failed to meet the requirements that the conduct be 
unsolicited, and that the defendant must be “clearly informed to cease” the conduct.41 
Moreover, the court reasoned that because the legislature contemplated that the 
Personal Anti-Stalking Statute would remedy the harm caused by such conduct, it 
would not “effect the objects” of the law to provide a remedy for the same level of 
harm under another subsection.42 Therefore, the court found that the victim did not 
have a remedy under the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, and dismissed that 
charge against the defendant.43
 This case comment contends that the New York County Criminal Court erred in 
dismissing the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute charge against the defendant 
because it: (1) disregarded the principles of statutory interpretation and used civil 
practice guidelines to define a term in a criminal statute and in doing so, employed 
an over-narrow definition of “place of employment or business”; (2) supported this 
narrow definition with assertions about the CPLR and civil practice that are at odds 
with current case law; and (3) read the information in a restrictive and unduly 
technical manner.
 First, the Marian court disregarded principles of statutory interpretation by 
failing to consult the textual construction, legislative intent, or legislative history of 
the statute before turning to an unrelated area of law.44 Under traditional principles 
of statutory interpretation, unless the court finds an ambiguity, the court must give 
effect to the plain meaning of the text.45 If the court finds an ambiguity, then it 
should look to the legislative intent and legislative history for guidance.46 However, 
the Marian court failed to engage in a textual analysis to address whether there was 
an ambiguity in the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute. Instead, it concluded that, 
because the term “place of employment or business” within an unrelated statute, the 
CPLR, is defined by courts as a physical location, the “fair import” of the term in 
general, and specifically within the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, must be a 
physical location.47
40. Id. at 688.
41. Id.; see also People v. Kitsikopoulos, No. 2014NY037848, 16 N.Y.S.3d 793, 2015 WL 2235070, at *7 
(Crim. Ct. May 13, 2015) (unpublished table decision).
42. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 687.
45. People v. Garson, 848 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (N.Y. 2006).
46. People v. Ballman, 930 N.E.2d 282, 284 (N.Y. 2010).
47. See Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 687. To support the statement that this was the traditional definition in New 
York, the court looked to civil practice, invoking the definition that is used for the purpose of serving a 
summons under the CPLR, “where the person is physically present with regularity, and  .  .  . regularly 
transact[s] business at that location.” Id. (quoting Rosario v. NES Med. Servs. of N.Y., P.C., 963 
N.Y.S.2d 295, 297 (App. Div. 2013)).
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 The court’s reliance on civil practice resulted in a narrow definition of “place of 
employment or business.” The court’s inappropriate deference to the CPLR caused 
the court to frame its final inquiry as whether an e-mail inbox is a place where the 
individual is physically present with regularity to transact business.48 But a work 
e-mail address is a vehicle through which someone can regularly transact business; 
thus, physical presence is not necessary. The court’s narrow interpretation is 
discordant with the legislature’s intent to strengthen the law, which includes offering 
victims protection from “[s]talkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront, 
threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims.”49
 Had the court followed the principles of statutory interpretation, it would have 
found that “place of employment or business” was ambiguous and that its 
interpretation is inconsistent with section 120.45’s purpose. Legislative intent 
regarding section 120.45 is expressed in the statute from which it was codified, the 
Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999, which states:
The unfortunate reality is that stalking victims have been intolerably forced 
to live in fear of their stalkers. Stalkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, 
confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims, 
often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical harm upon them. Current 
law does not adequately recognize the damage to public order and individual 
safety caused by these offenders. Therefore, our laws must be strengthened to 
provide clear recognition of the dangerousness of stalking.50
This statement illustrates that the legislature intended to provide strong protection 
against stalking in section 120.45.
 Another relevant piece of legislative history was an amendment made to section 
120.45 in October 2014, just nine months before the Marian decision.51 The 
legislative amendment stated that the meaning of “following” in the Personal Anti-
Stalking Statute shall include “unauthorized tracking of such person’s movements or 
location through the use of a global positioning system or other device.”52 The 
legislature cited the increased prevalence of technology in stalking cases as the reason 
for the modification.53 So, by the time of Marian, the legislature had already 
determined that “following,” which in prior cases had been limited to a physical act, 
could be done remotely through the use of technology. Had the court engaged in a 
textual analysis of the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, it would have noted an 
ambiguity in the phrase “place of employment or business.” The court could have 
48. See id. at 687–88.
49. Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999, ch. 635, § 2, 1999 N.Y. Laws 3365, 3365 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2017)).
50. Id.
51. An Act to Amend the Penal Law, in Relation to Stalking in the Fourth Degree, ch. 184, § 1, 2014 N.Y. 
Laws 922, 922 (codified at Penal § 120.45).
52. Id.
53. Legislative Memorandum Relating to Ch. 184, 2014 N.Y. Laws 1693, 1693.
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found guidance in the legislative intent that would have led to an interpretation that 
belied the one the court ascertained from the CPLR and civil practice.
 Second, the court used outdated case law to determine that serving a summons to 
an e-mail address is an alternative (less valid) method to traditional “nail and mail” 
service because an e-mail address is not a “physical location,” as the CPLR requires.54 
While e-mail is not a physical domain, even if it is accepted, arguendo, that the 
CPLR’s definition of “place of employment or business” applies in a criminal context, 
the court’s assertion that physicality is the reason for the distinction between e-mail 
and other methods of service is not supported by current case law.55 Courts applying 
New York law that have considered service through e-mail to be an alternative to 
traditional forms of service have done so not because of physicality, but because of 
concerns regarding due process and whether e-mail messages provide the recipient 
with sufficient notice of a pending lawsuit.56 However, courts have long considered 
traditional forms of service, such as publication, to be valid independent of their 
likelihood of being received.57 Accordingly, as courts have grown more comfortable 
with online service, they have increasingly upheld its validity as a form of service.58
 Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. was an early case discussing the standard for 
service through the Internet.59 In Fortunato, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York noted that electronic service had until then been permitted 
only in cases when evidence existed that the electronic medium was actually used to 
receive messages by the person being served.60 The court found that neither the 
Facebook profile at issue, nor the e-mail address posted thereon, was shown to be 
operational and actually used to receive messages by the party for whom the summons 
and complaint were intended.61 Although the court in Fortunato did not think highly 
54. See People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 687 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
55. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 448 (Civ. Ct. 2008).
56. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 7, 2012) (denying service via e-mail or Facebook because there was no evidence that the e-mail 
address or Facebook page was in fact owned or used by the third-party defendant); S.E.C. v. Nnebe, No. 
01 Civ. 5247(KMW)KNF, 2003 WL 402377, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003) (allowing service by 
publication when there was evidence that service by the traditional methods was impracticable); Baidoo 
v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 715 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that service via Facebook was a “method 
reasonably calculated to give defendant notice”); Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 448 (allowing service via 
e-mail because e-mail had a higher chance of notifying the defendant than publication did, when 
traditional means of service were unavailable).
57. See Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 447–48. As the Snyder court notes, “courts have long resorted to publication 
of the summons in a newspaper as a means of alternate service,” id. at 447, and “[New York] law has long 
been comfortable with many situations in which it is evident, as a practical matter, that parties to whom 
notice was ostensibly addressed would never in fact receive it,” id. at 448 (quoting Dobkin v. Chapman, 
236 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1968)).
58. See, e.g., Safadjou v. Mohammadi, 964 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–04 (App. Div. 2013).
59. 2012 WL 2086950, at *1.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id.
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of improvised service by means of Facebook, subsequent cases have allowed electronic 
service when the medium was shown to belong to the party to be served and that 
such party actually used that medium for communicating.62
 In Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, the New York County Supreme Court upheld service 
through Facebook.63 In Baidoo, the court distinguished the plaintiff ’s situation from 
that of the Fortunato plaintiff, determining that the plaintiff sufficiently proved that 
the Facebook profile was both operational and actually used by the intended party.64 
In light of this finding, Baidoo not only allowed service through Facebook, but also, 
in an unprecedented verdict, ruled that service through Facebook alone was 
sufficient.65 Previous cases upheld service through Facebook as long as it was 
accompanied by another method, usually e-mail,66 which demonstrates that courts 
are growing to accept e-mail as a legitimate form of service.67 The Baidoo decision 
stands for the proposition that the newness of service through social media is not a 
sufficient reason for a court to reject it, especially considering that the overlap of the 
law and modern technology is a concept to which courts must adapt.68
 Further, had the Marian court looked to more contemporary and informed case 
law involving service with process to businesses, it would have found the same legal 
principles outlined in Fortunato and Baidoo.69 In Snyder v. Alternate Energy, Inc., the 
New York City Civil Court for New York County allowed service to a work e-mail 
address in lieu of a physical business location because the plaintiff could not locate a 
place of business where the intended party was physically present with regularity, a 
factor necessary to perfect service.70 The Snyder court found that despite the 
likelihood that the intended party was operating out of an unknown, physical place 
of business, service to an e-mail address was proper because the intended party 
regularly used the work e-mail address.71 The court expanded the definition of “place 
of employment or business” to include a virtual location from which the defendant 
regularly transacted business because due process concerns were satisfied.72 The 
Marian court neglected this trend in its discussion of civil practice case law.73
62. See Alfred E. Mann Living Tr. v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 910 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422–23 (App. Div. 
2010); Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
63. 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
64. Id. at 714.
65. Id. at 716.
66. Id. at 714–15.
67. Id. at 714.
68. See id. at 713–14.
69. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Civ. Ct. 2008).
70. Id. at 445, 448–49.
71. Id. at 448.
72. See id.
73. See People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 687–88 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
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 Third, the court subjected the information to an unfair and unduly technical 
reading, leading to improper conclusions that contradicted the very case law that the 
Marian court cited in its decision.74 An information, similar to a felony indictment, is 
required only to lay out the factual allegations of a misdemeanor charge in a manner 
that “give[s] an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense.”75 The factual allegations 
must be “adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the 
same offense.”76 To require an information to go beyond this threshold is to subject its 
allegations to an unfair and unduly technical reading.77 The Marian court reasoned 
that even if it erred in its conclusion that a work e-mail is not a “place of employment 
or business,” it was proper to dismiss the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute charge 
against the defendant because the information did not allege that the e-mails were 
unsolicited and the defendant was “clearly informed to cease” the conduct.78
 Regarding the requirement that the e-mails must be unsolicited (uninvited and 
unwanted), the court cited precedent from People v. Kitsikopoulos, wherein the New 
York County Criminal Court found that the language “initiating communication” in 
the Personal Anti-Stalking Statute “is clearly intended to cover only contact that is 
uninvited and unwanted, whether electronic, in person, or by mail.”79 The 
Kitsikopoulos court provided that whether the communication is uninvited and 
unwanted depends on two factors: (1) whether the communication emanated from 
the defendant and was not invited by or in response to communications from the 
victim; and (2) the effect the communication has on the victim, not the specific 
content of the communication.80 As to the first factor, the court stated that the 
information must allege that the defendant initiated the communications.81 To 
illustrate the second factor, the irrelevance of the content of the communication, the 
court contrasted signing an e-mail to a friend with “I love you” versus sending 
multiple unsolicited e-mails to a friend asserting “I love you.”82 The Kitsikopoulos 
court counseled that the first situation would not meet the test for uninvited and 
74. Id. at 688 (citing People v. Kitsikopoulos, No. 2014NY037848, 16 N.Y.S.3d 793, 2015 WL 2235070, at *7 
(Crim. Ct. May 13, 2015) (unpublished table decision), for the proposition that the phrase “initiating 
communication” in the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute requires a victim to allege that e-mails sent to 
a work e-mail address were unsolicited).
75. People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (N.Y. 2000).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688.
79. 2015 WL 2235070, at *7. While Kitsikopoulos involved an information that alleged a count under the 
Personal Anti-Stalking Statute, id., the basis of the “unsolicited” requirement comes from language 
appearing in both the Personal and Workplace Anti-Stalking Statutes—“initiating communication”—
and thus the requirement pertains to informations that allege either charge. See N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 120.45(2)–(3) (McKinney 2017).
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unwanted communication under the Personal Anti-Stalking Statute, but the second 
one “easily could.”83 The second hypothetical situation is directly on point with the 
facts of the Marian case,84 yet the Marian court concluded that the information 
failed to show that the work e-mails, but not the personal e-mails, were unsolicited.85
 Regarding whether the information sufficiently alleged that the defendant was 
clearly informed to cease the conduct, the Marian court stated: “Specifically, [the 
information] alleges that . . . the complainant told the defendant to leave the bar in 
which she had accosted the complainant, but the defendant instead waited outside . . . , 
followed the complainant . . . , then continued to stalk the complainant for nearly six 
more weeks.”86 The court concluded that this demand, as stated in the information, 
was sufficient to inform the defendant to stop following the victim, calling her, and 
e-mailing her personal e-mail address, but not sufficient to inform the defendant to 
cease sending e-mails to her work e-mail address.87
 The Marian court’s conclusions that the information failed to allege that the 
work e-mails were unsolicited and that the defendant was clearly informed to cease 
the conduct stem from an unduly restrictive and technical reading of the misdemeanor 
information. First, the allegations in the information satisfied the Kitsikopoulos test 
for unsolicited communication.88 As to the first factor, the information alleged that 
the defendant initiated the contact by “bombard[ing]” the victim with various 
communications, including the e-mails at issue in the proceeding.89 In relation to the 
second factor, the uninvited e-mails asserted the defendant’s desire to be with the 
victim, with the effect of causing the victim to fear for her safety.90 These allegations 
satisfied the Kitsikopoulos test, and gave the defendant adequate notice to prepare a 
defense to the uninvited and unwanted communication.91 Second, the allegation that 
the victim demanded that the defendant leave the bar to which she followed the 
victim, clearly informed the defendant to cease her conduct.92 However, the Marian 
court found this allegation sufficient to inform the defendant to cease all conduct 
except for sending e-mails to the victim’s work e-mail address.93 This exception 
requires the information to go beyond merely being adequately detailed to prevent 
the accused from being tried twice for the same offense, and thus is an unduly 
83. Id.
84. See People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 685 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
85. Id. at 688–89.
86. Id. at 689.
87. Id. at 688–89.
88. Kitsikopoulos, 2015 WL 2235070, at *7.
89. See Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685.
90. Id.
91. See Kitsikopoulos, 2015 WL 2235070, at *3, *7.
92. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 689.
93. See id. at 688–89 (dismissing only the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute claim for failure to allege that 
the defendant was “clearly informed to cease” sending e-mails to the victim’s work e-mail address).
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restrictive and technical interpretation. Both of these conclusions subjected the 
information to an unwarranted level of scrutiny, even though the information 
provided the defendant with adequate notice to prepare a defense and would prevent 
the defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.94
 The court’s decision to exempt work e-mail addresses from the purview of the 
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute is damaging from a policy perspective. It denies a 
victim recourse against conduct that causes her to reasonably fear that her employment, 
business, or career is threatened. The result in Marian creates a troubling situation 
where a victim whose stalker calls her at home and at work has recourse under both 
the Personal and Workplace Anti-Stalking Statutes, but a victim whose stalker 
e-mails her at home and at work is limited to recourse solely under the Personal Anti-
Stalking Statute. This loophole could potentially be exploited by cyberstalkers, who 
can harm victims both personally and professionally.
 The court underestimated the seriousness of this behavior by falsely concluding 
that violent, threatening behavior is not present in an e-mail, and that it would 
neither “promote justice” nor “effect the objects” of the law to consider e-mail to be 
behavior the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute intended to prevent.95 This assertion 
is legally unsound, because a conviction under the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute 
does not require a threat of immediate and real danger; such a requirement would be 
a legitimate reason to exclude e-mail from conduct targeted by the statute because it 
entails an imminence that a remote communication like e-mail does not present.96 
Furthermore, many stalking cases include e-mails with threats as severe as the 
assault, rape, or murder of the victim.97 Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
the validity of online threats.98 The Marian court’s conclusion ignores the nature of 
stalking itself: that a stalker purposefully selects a victim and persistently engages in 
escalating conduct that is likely to frighten the victim.99 While each instance of 
conduct might seem “benign  .  .  . in isolation,” the collective conduct “amounts to 
psychological terrorism when done incessantly.”100
 Likewise, the court’s conclusion fails to recognize the undisputable truth that 
just as the Internet has changed most facets of daily life, it has changed the face of 
94. See People v. Cobb, 768 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Crim. Ct. 2003) (finding that requiring an accusatory 
instrument to allege the specific, “actual date” by which the defendant was supposed to have registered 
as a sex offender would be subjecting it to an unduly restrictive and technical reading because the 
information alleged that the defendant had failed to register within the required ten-day period).
95. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688.
96. See People v. Wong, 776 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
97. See Joseph C. Merschman, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for Contemporary 
Legislation, 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 255, 256–57 (2001) (discussing severe cyberstalking cases that 
included threats of murder and rape sent via e-mail).
98. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004–08 (2015) (discussing a defendant’s threatening 
conduct on Facebook).
99. See Merschman, supra note 97, at 262 (describing the escalation to violence that is associated with classic 
stalking behavior).
100. Id. at 269.
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stalking. A stalker is no longer necessarily a delusional malefactor who waits outside 
your home, approaches you with unwanted tokens of affection, or ducks behind 
corners and bushes while following you.101 Instead, through the evolution of modern 
technology, a new breed of stalker has emerged: one who can follow, threaten, and 
frighten victims from anywhere, at any time.
 The court turned a blind eye to the realities of technological advancement by 
excluding e-mail from the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute. In a time when many 
people have their work e-mail on smartphones, and even more have e-mail access on 
laptops, their employment relies on the Internet. Excluding a work e-mail address 
from the purview of the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute because it is not a physical 
location keeps the court shackled to a narrow and anachronistic idea of employment. 
Also, the court’s conclusion that the communication did not meet the requirement of 
being unsolicited leads to the troubling inference that the victim wanted to be 
bombarded by communications from her stalker. Finally, concluding that the victim 
did not clearly inform her stalker to cease e-mailing her at work puts an undue 
burden on the victim to further engage with her stalker to specifically list each 
instance of conduct she wants stopped.
 The unfortunate reality of the Marian decision is that a victim who is stalked 
through e-mail to her work e-mail address has been forced to continue living in fear 
of her stalker. The defendant in Marian repeatedly followed, phoned, wrote, 
confronted, and unacceptably intruded upon the victim, likely inflicting upon her 
emotional and psychological harm.102 The decision to dismiss the violation of the 
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute does not adequately recognize the damage to public 
order and risk to an individual’s safety caused by this type of offender. With the 
lion’s share of cyberstalking victims reporting having been stalked through e-mail,103 
the Marian court’s exception likely leaves a large number of victims with insufficient 
legal protection. People v. Marian fails to appreciate the clear danger that this type of 
stalking entails and will only serve to subject victims of twenty-first century stalking 
techniques to inadequate protections under outdated twentieth century laws.
101. See People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 40 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing a stalker who trailed the victim and 
presented her with f lowers as a sign of his affection).
102. People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 685–86 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
103. See Stalking, Bureau Just. Stat., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=973 (last updated Feb. 17, 
2016) (noting that eighty-three per cent of cyberstalking victims were stalked by e-mail).

